Blink First? The National Counter-terrorism Centre or NCTC, the proposed antiterror agency, has become a bone of contention between the Centre and Opposition-ruled states (plus some ruled by allies such as Mamata Banerjee of West Bengal). Opposing groups believe that the NCTC encroaches upon their law and order jurisdiction. Those in favour, debate that the Centre will help create a unified pool of intelligence resource with the body. What is NCTC really? The genie in the bottle or the veritable monster encroaching upon state freedom?

The recent Assembly election results were supposed to put to rest several debates haunting the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government in New Delhi and give the Centre a muchneeded leverage vis-a-vis states ruled by the regional parties, who have been in the forefront blocking big ticket economic policies and initiatives. Instead, the poll outcome has undermined the strength of the governing alliance. And, it has added one more regional opponent in the name of Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh. The first victim of this new political development has been a plan to put in place the National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC). The body has become a bone of contention, with the opposition crying foul over what they believe to be an encroachment upon the state’s law and order jurisdiction. The new anti-terrorism body flows out of Amendments to the 2008 Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, created after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. The 2008 Amendments were personally drafted by the Home Minister, P Chidambaram, in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha, Arun Jaitley. The NCTC was proposed as a part of the new security architecture on December 23, 2009, and the proposal was put up before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in April 2010. The CCS cleared the NCTC early in 2012, after almost two years of deliberation. But the move, supposed to be a 'great step ahead' in establishing a pan-Indian, anti-terror body, has hit the political wall. According to reports, the NCTC will not be an independent institution, but a part of the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The Director of IB will supervise it. This could very well impede the independent audit and supervision of the counter-terrorism division of the IB, leading several critics to state that present deficiencies in IB’s counter-terrorism functions are more likely to get duplicated and magnified. To know more of both the votaries' and the naysayers’ viewpoints; Democratic World spoke to one of its most vocal critics, Chief Minister of Orissa Naveen Patnaik, to understand the view of parties opposing this anti-terror body; and to Gopal Krishna Pillai, former Home Secretary and an architect of the NCTC, which is largely modelled on its US namesake.

NAVEEN PATNAIK// All the states of India, including Orissa, are deeply concerned about the threats of terrorism, extremism and security. As the Chief Minister of the state, it is my job to be constantly vigilant as far as the security of my state is concerned. Just as it is the job of the central government to have an overview of the nation’s security. Having said that, a state’s security—at the end of the day—is the state government’s concern. I would like to revert to what the present Union Home Minister, P Chidambaram, has often repeated, “When it comes to matters of state security, the state should be consulted.” And he has stressed that a state’s security, and its police, are state subjects. Despite all the statements, when it came to tabling a plan for the National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC), the Centre consulted none of the involved parties. As far as the NCTC notification is concerned, I firmly believe that before a pan-India plan is put into action, governments across India should have been consulted—why were they not? Noticing the Centre’s oversight, I was left with no option but write to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and present my take on the matter, and discuss the issue with my colleagues, Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal, Dr Jayalalithaa, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and Chandra Babu Naidu, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh. With them I have found support. I believe that certain consultations are in order because we live in a federal system of rule. India’s federalism is enshrined in the Constitution which envisions a clear division of powers—states and the Centre enact and legislate within their sphere of activity, none violates its limits or tries to encroach upon the functions of the other. Also, our Constitution enumerates three lists: Union, State and Concurrent Lists. The State List consists of 66 subjects of local interests including the police. Thus, NCTC seems strangely incongruous in such a context. Sadly, the criticism that some of us (opposing parties) are indulging in the usual 'political opportunism' is lending more to the confusion over the issue. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) has acted in an authoritarian manner. Now the Centre is stating that they will talk to the states. The 'consultation', as and when it happens will lead to clarity—whether the plans are indeed viable and really in the interests of the state. Having said that, all of us are united in the fight against terror. All state governments (including mine) are there to help the Centre fight terrorism, extremism and security threats. The states have been fighting against domestic and foreign threats, anyway. Take Orissa for example; the state has been grappling with the Naxalite problem for decades now. The NCTC issue has pointed to a singular truth: the arrogance of the Centre and the complacency of the present UPA sarkar. It does not believe it is accountable to any other body, panel or government. My concern is the authoritarian notification with draconian overtones regarding law and order among others issues, in which the state governments have not been consulted. As far as the plans are concerned, the socalled masterplan (US NCTC) has enough shortcomings and flaws that do not make it foolproof. There have been enough discrepancies noticed in the functioning of the US NCTC and the Intelligence systems for collection and analysis. These should provide important lessons to India. The mere creation of NCTC is unlikely to improve intelligence coordination. A system of incentives and disincentives for sharing of verified inputs should be put in place—without omitting the role of the states.

GK PILLAI// In a nutshell, after being formed, the National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC) will be a national centre in which leads and information coming in from all pan-India agencies will converge. If there is such an agency, it would make counter-terrorism, intelligence work coordinated and systematic, sustaining the possibility of a follow-up. It is the Centre’s move to 'pre-empt' any terrorist activity. The NCTC will be closely linked with National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), which is likely to be one of the key arms of the NCTC. As far as intelligence inputs are concerned, such inputs arrive at concerned panels in bits—it is not possible to connect all dots, all the time. We need groups working on a fulltime basis on all leads, 24x7. Only an agency such as the NCTC can make that happen. It will draw up plans and coordinate actions for counter-terrorism and will integrate intelligence pertaining to terrorism and analyse it. NCTC officers shall also have the power to arrest and search under the 2008 Unlawful Activities Prevention Act. THE CONTEXT for such a body got stronger after the 2008 Mumbai attacks. In August 2008, intelligence bodies received information on the possibility of a sea-borne attack. However, bad weather prevented it from happening on the designated date. A month later, intelligence agencies began focussing on more immediate issues. Had there been an agency to pursue leads without the pressure of the immediate, the police would have been in a position to prevent the Mumbai attacks. HAVING SAID that, I will admit that NCTC is not a foolproof mechanism. In the US, NCTC is present and yet, attacks do happen. However, the probability of terrorist misadventures are lessened when there’s added vigilance. Opposing the NCTC is irrational— it is more politicking than concern. Already, laws under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act allow security personnel to make arrests with help from the local police. How is it different from what the NCTC is supposed to do? I realise that the process of implementing the NCTC will be delayed now, due to the politicisation of the issue. But, it will be put in place once the NATGRID is completed. Admittedly, the Cabinet Committee on Security should have consulted the state governments, and only then, announced the formation of the NCTC—taking the roundabout route was a mistake. But, now that the consultation is taking place, and the home secretary is calling state heads and chief ministers, the Opposition should be rethought. State governments or local police are always consulted before any “local” arrests. Even the National Investigation Agency (NIA) works in tandem with local police for it to conduct investigations, because only the local forces are more aware of the ground reality. Viewing the NCTC as an “attack on the federal structure” is erroneous. The states often resort for Centre’s help to tackle terrorism. Can every threat be tackled individually? No. Why? Because terrorist organisations are too mobile: they travel across state and national borders. What happens when the state agency has to arrest or investigate someone in another state? How do they do it unless there is a pan-India organisation with jurisdiction across borders assisting them? As for the possibility of conflict between the NCTC and Intelligence Bureaus (IBs)—there are none. A bulk of the NCTC personnel will be from the IBs. They will follow-up inputs coming from the field. India won’t become a police state overnight with the NCTC. There are enough checks and balances in this democracy of ours, including the jurisdiction. India already has a Multi Agency Centre (MAC). Increasingly, the Army, Navy, RAW and IB are operating together and sharing intelligence, albeit informally. But informal interaction lacks organisation. What NCTC would do is place a system. It will connect MAC, which would be subsumed into NCTC, and all agencies reporting to it, in Delhi and state capitals. Between the Centre, where almost two dozen agencies coordinate with MAC, and states, almost 500 stakeholders are involved in counterterror activities. The NCTC will not have any foot-soldiers to collect information, but will depend on other agencies. The head of the body, an additional director generallevel police officer, will report to the union home secretary.