New Delhi and Moscow have finally agreed to a work share agreement for the co-production of a new Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). It fructified in the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Goa although there are media reports that in February 2016 the much delayed talks were revived at the behest of India’s Defence establishment. Seen as an enormous fillip to India’s relations with Russia, it would also add to Indian armed forces’ modernisation efforts whilst greatly supporting the Indian endeavour in “Make in India”.
But most importantly, the fifth generation combat aircraft, as conceptualised will make a strategic change in the use of air power as the Indian Air Force (IAF) fighters could operate with impunity in the skies without being detected by the adversary’s air defence systems. It would lead to infusion of frontline technologies in stealth capabilities along with all other state of art sophistications developed over the years.
The plans to develop such an aircraft had first made news way back in 2001 during the Moscow Air Show presented at the Fifth International and Aviation Space Salon organised by Russian Rosoboronexport. It was during the show that Russian government’s programme to develop this aircraft for the Russian Air Force was made public. The prototype was to fly by 2006 and aircraft for delivery were to be ready by 2010. It was already showcased in an air show in China in 2006. The expenditures to develop the aircraft and the engine were assessed at $1.5 billion and $600 million respectively.
In October 2007 media had reported that the Indian Government’s cabinet committee on security has concurred with the proposal of India and Russia to jointly develop a 5th generation multi role combat aircraft. And that “India was encouraged by the Russian offer to involve itself right from the start of the project”. This assessment did not come true in its entirety. Evidently, India is joining midway in the Russian effort. Although, the extent of the progress is somewhat hazy.
In the past however, there have been rumblings within India’s defence establishment on Russia’s inadequacies in meeting India’s defence equipment procurement needs. The disenchantments had stemmed from several factors. Deficiencies in materials, staggering cost escalation and unbearably delayed delivery schedules, had caused anguish. There were matters of quality, costs and time; all quite material and relevant for operational needs of militaries.
THE RELATIONSHIP
Obviously, it will only be prudent therefore, to take a well considered view of the India-Russian military relationship through all its strands and discourses. In principle, it was an alliance of political empathy and shared mutual interests which had numerous linkages. We cannot but acknowledge that the Indo-Soviet strategic equation was the most potent segment of the overall relationship and continues to be one now with Russia having taken on the mantle. The 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship has duly been accepted by the Putin regime. Neither can one escape the truth, however grudgingly in certain quarters, that the relationship saw India through difficult times. But there was an often voiced contrary view that things need not be the same with truncated Russia as they used to be with Soviet Union. That India must do whatever is necessary in its own national interests in these changed circumstances. This issue merits a closer analysis albeit on an extremely narrow framework of military aviation.
The intense spirit of defence cooperation was the most influential ingredient of the relationship. It was between two nations and it was difficult to term it as a pure commercial venture. A broad illustrative survey would be very useful considering the fact that Soviet Russia has been India’s biggest supplier of defence equipment since the 1960s.The gift of the IL-14 aircraft to India in the year 1958 to transport Indian VIPs is seen as a milestone in the relationship.
With the Indian Air Force opting for the MiG-21 Interceptors aircraft in 1962, a new chapter in the defence procurement for the air force opened. In 1968, India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) factories started producing the airframes and engines along with the components at separate facilities under their aegis. This set into motion a supply chain from the Soviets and then with Russia with which the IAF went on to induct combat aircraft of MiG series 23, 25, 27 and 29 and of SU series 7 and the latest 30MKI. There were several up-gradations as well.
Similarly, transport aircraft ANs 12 and 32 and the ILs-76 augmented the Indian military transport aircraft fleet. The heavy lift IL-78, progressively took on the roles for mid air refueling and the IL-76 emerged as the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) platform for Israel’s Phalcon Radar later. Numerous variants of the Mi series of military transport and attack helicopters were also inducted. There were a prolific chain of Air Defence systems consisting of low to high level radars and from shoulder fired Igla MANPADS (Manportable Air Defence Systems) to high firing Dvina and Pechora SAMS (Surface to Air Missiles). Outside the erstwhile Warsaw pact countries these were the biggest inductions and perhaps much higher than in these countries.
THE NEW OFFER
Under the new offer, India will have to pay about $3.7 billion, instead of $6 billion, for the technological know-how and three prototypes of the FGFA. About six years ago, India had agreed to pay $295 million towards the preliminary design of the fighter, then called in India Perspective Multi-role Fighter (PMF).
But even in arriving at this solution, New Delhi and Moscow had traversed through several discordant issues relating to basic clauses of joint development that had formed the edifice of the initial proposal. One suspects that at the heart of the matter were issues of moneys to be spent on “work and cost share, aircraft technology, as well as the number of aircraft to be ordered”. There are media reports of late 2015 that Russia had vastly reduced the number of aircraft they plan to procure emerging out of the joint developmental process. It is evident that they had continued to work on their prototype not wanting to wait for the Indian government to work out a plan. This was not tenable to the Indian side.
To overcome this deadlock therefore, in the ongoing discussions Russia had offered its prototype PAK FA T-50 along with technology transfers as an alternate for further development to satisfy Indian requirements. After evaluating the first prototype the IAF had wanted more than two score changes to overcome weaknesses identified by them in the plane’s engine along with the aircraft’s capabilities to achieve stealth and weapon carrying. In the ensuing developmental process, which also perhaps include India developing its own engine, Indian test pilots will monitor the evolution of the combat platform till its completion. It will be India’s own developed FGFA to meet its specific needs.
STRICTLY STRUCTURED REGIMES
Several lessons have been learnt by India during its relationship with the Russians. Whilst mutuality is the core of cooperative spirit at a government to government level, at a working level the programmes must be implemented under a strictly structured regime duly covered by protection of legal provisions and even exit policies. Historically, such business practices have stood the test of time even in the most telling circumstances and have shown the way. The relationship with Russia goes well beyond the supplier syndrome and soundly based contract would only be able to see through the passage.