Indian Politics of Scaremongering

As the Budget Session of Parliament begins, news channels and commentators have begun talking of the dangers to democracy resulting from a single-party majority and the lack of a numerically-strong opposition party. This issue is a bit silly because it essentially reflects the news media’s desperation to fill time and space.

If the 16th Lok Sabha have conducted debates and written articles mourning an indecisive mandate. That apart, it would appear this is the first time in India—or in democracies anywhere in the world—that a party has won over 50 per cent of seats. As majorities go, the BJP’s is hardly overwhelming. At 282, it has got just 10 seats more than the half-way figure. This is not even a two-thirds majority, which Indira Gandhi won in 1980. It is much behind the mammoth 415 seats, or 75 per cent of the Lok Sabha, that Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress commanded between 1984 and 1989. If India and Indian democracy survived that, and came out richer for the experience, why is there so much scaremongering this time?

In Parliament, an opposition’s performance is often a question of quality rather than quantity. In 2004, the BJP had 138 seats in the Lok Sabha, only seven fewer than the Congress, which led the UPA coalition. However, the BJP could not make use of its numbers and delivered a very poor performance in the 14th Lok Sabha (2004-09). Its leadership was tired and jaded, and its frequent walkouts and boycotts ended up giving the government more room than it had expected.

In contrast, despite his gargantuan mandate of December 1984, by 1987 or at least 1988, Rajiv Gandhi was facing extreme hostility in the Lok Sabha courtesy a small but plucky opposition collective. This was a precursor to the Congress’ defeat in 1989. If you consider parties such as the CPI(M) and the CPI – both very active in Parliament in the Rajiv period – it is worth noting that they punched well above their weight. The presence of first-rate parliamentarians like Indrajit Gupta and Somnath Chatterjee—and in an earlier era Jyotirmoy Basu—more than made up for the modest size of the Left Front contingent.

The problem in 2014 is not that the opposition is tiny. Since the BJP has 282 seats and the NDA—as things stand—has 336, that still leaves over 200 seats to the non-Treasury benches. The point is the Congress is down to 44 seats or about a fifth of the non- NDA space. This is what is worrying the party’s fellow travellers and its intellectual ecosystem—the fact that the Congress may not matter.

The Congress’s choice of leader in the Lok Sabha reflects its confusion and its dilemma. Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi refused to take the job and become the de facto—though not quite de jure, as the Congress does not have the requisite one-tenth of all members—leader of the opposition. Their nominee is Mallikarjun Kharge, a veteran politician from Gulbarga (Karnataka). It would be unfair to dismiss Kharge as merely a caste leader. He is a big name in north Karnataka, with Lok Sabha election had thrown up a hung House, the same people would goodwill across communities, including among Lingayats who have of late backed the BJP in his state. He is also the tallest Karnataka Congress politician of his generation who has not become chief minister.

This is an impressive CV; if the Congress were choosing a new leader for Karnataka or opting to send a signal to the state, Kharge’s nomination to a party post or a senior public office would have been understandable. Is he, however, suited to the role of Lok Sabha leader? Is he up to the task of quick barbs and assessments, and floor coordination with other parties, to put the BJP on the backfoot and confound its ministers within minutes of the House assembling at 11.00 am? True, Kharge has been leader of the opposition in the Karnataka assembly and did make an impassioned speech in the opening session of the 16th Lok Sabha second-term MP.

Would not Kamal Nath or even Amarinder Singh—who won a creditable victory in Amritsar against Arun Jaitley and has been named the Congress deputy leader in the Lok Sabha—have been better options? Most important, what message is Mr Gandhi conveying by shying away from the job? If he cannot lead the party in opposition can he lead it in government, and if not then what is the Congress’ road map for recovery and for 2019? Can the Congress operate under a would-be leader who doesn’t want to take a lead role in the Lok Sabha simply because he will be required to attend the House regularly and any sudden departures and short trips overseas will be noticed?

These are the existential subjects confronting the Congress. They denote a crisis for the party—not a crisis of Indian democracy. Simply because the Congress is not in a position to provide the opposition, it does not follow that there will be no opposition. Between them the AIADMK, Trinamool Congress, BJD, TRS and YSR Congress have 111 seats, 2.5 times the strength of the Congress. When necessary, they will unite to take on the Narendra Modi government. At other times, some or all of these parties may do deals with the NDA and support specific legislations. That is how parliament functions and operates in any case. The Congress, due to its numbers and more so due to its defeatism and commitment to shielding its vice-president, will be peripheral to this process, at least for the immediate future.

As such, the question is not whether the lack of an opposition is healthy for democracy. That supposition is not valid because its fundamental premise is flawed. The real question is has the Congress written itself out of the drama, the give and take, and the thrust and parry that will inevitably be part of the 16th Lok Sabha?