India’s engagement in its wider neighbourhood, as far as its Foreign Policy is concerned, is weak for a political and economic power that claims to be rising, and interested, in managing the world’s affairs. India’s relations with regional agglomerations such as Africa, West Asia, Central Asia and ASEAN provide a mixed bag of insights into Indian foreign policy at work. However, the country appears ‘most weak’ when liaisons with its immediate neighbours are concerned—can building better trade relations improve things?

IS INDIAN Foreign Policy constrained? If we look at the larger paradigm on how Indian Foreign Policy is conducted, then we will have to borrow from Shyam Saran who explained its scope as, an “immediate neighbourhood” including South Asia (plus); then an extended periphery including Central and South East Asia and South Pacific; and the larger section where there is maximum clarity on what India needs to do (Europe and Africa). In that larger section, Foreign Policy is largely dictated by economic ideas, constraints and ties. In South East Asia, India it is said wants to do ‘much more’, but because of India’s ability and image (when compared to China) it is not able to. India has made loud noises about Looking East. But if it really wanted to look east, the country by now should have had its presence in the area. Why have we not been able to have better ties with Myanmar? Because, to do that we will also have to make a bridge between Bangladesh, eastern India, northeastern India and Myanmar. India, it seems, is constrained by our own internal shortcomings. Perhaps, that is why it has not being able to successfully counter Indian insurgent groups based in Myanmar. To understand the region better, one has to look at its history; India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, some 60 years ago, were all a part of one singular geopolitical entity. Myanmar was part of British India, as was India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Sri Lanka was under the British, so geographically, politically and monetarily, South Asia was one entity. There were economic similarities. When they got fragmented, from being an integrated region, South Asia became non-integrated, fragile. That also hit the economic prowess of every country and the petty quarrels that came forth due to the fragmented structure of all these entities, including India, made the region poorer—the region was not organised enough to boost business or exports. But it all changed from 1991, there was a growth spurt in the region and the rate of growth was fastest in India. The domino effect rippled beyond the borders of this country. There was a change in the group. Suddenly there was a coherency and coordination in this region, especially if you looked at Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. They started to look at India as a “role model”. So, the countries were deriving ideas and inspiration from each other. DW talked to two experts, Dr Prabir De, RIS and D. Suba Chandran, IPCS, on whether India’s Foreign Policy reflects its trade interests.

PRABIR DE // India’s foreign policy traditionally used to be South Asia-centric. Today, however, it has a more global interests— as is apparent by the visits made by global, political and economic luminaries to India. For the past eight years, India has shown exponential growth in its bid to counter China and it is finally on the world map as a emerging and developing market, and India’s foreign policy, too, is showing these marked changes. India’s erstwhile Nehruvian policies, based on the ideas of detachment—we will not go to the Russian side, neither will we be a part of NATO—all those ideas are slowly changing. India is an active member of world forums and sessions, whether economic or political. It is no longer a non-alliance partner. As far as India’s South Asian foreign policies are concerned, the economic engagements have become more pronounced and as such our foreign policy has started to show that trend to engage more with the neighbours. Economic integration between India and her South Asian neighbours has become more. Of course the relationship is not the same with everyone as various dimensions and variations are present in this equation. Between India and Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, in terms of trade and investment, major imports are from India. In case of Nepal, 60 per cent of its imports come from India. In case of Bangladesh, over 20 per cent imports is from India, while in case of Bhutan, 80 per cent is from India while 30 per cent of Sri Lanka's imports are from Indian shores. What about India? Truly India does not depend on its neighbours as much as they do. Our economic profile requires a large amount of energy, to get that we cannot depend simply on our South Asian neighbours. India also needs a large amount of technological expertise for which it cannot depend exclusively on its South Asian neighbours. India’s dependence is less than that of its neighbours, but it is rising fast. When it comes to textile and ready-made garments; India imports a large amount from Bangladesh. Because Bangladesh is one of the top three garment export countries in the world. India has allowed dutyfree exports from Bangladesh. These changes, especially exchanges, are reflected in our foreign policy. Similarly, India exports tea from Sri Lanka, dry fruits from Pakistan and Afghanistan and there is a good amount of exchange between the countries as far as services are concerned. In Myanmar, India is much engaged in its politics. The country was one of the forward- looking and growing countries till the military took it over in the 1968. Today, economic sanctions have been lifted and people of Myanmar are looking more towards India as a “big brother”, as they are somewhat frustrated by the Chinese engagement with the country from 1998. We can safely say that India is more invested in developing activities in Myanmar, roads, infrastructure and education, than China ever was. Our Foreign Minister visited Myanmar in 2012. ONGC now owns stakes in two blocks of gas reserves in Myanmar. To bring that gas to India, the companies will need the Bangladeshi approval and if it cannot obtain that they will have to sell it to China. It seems that the one-way street is getting more integrated and, foreign policy is starting to manifest the changes.

D. SUBA CHANDRAN // We have to see the question in two sets of responses that India in terms of economic situation within the region, especially when it comes to the immediate neighbours. Trade issues never made sense in building a better relationship with any one of our neighbouring countries— at least it seems thus when you look at the foreign policy that has been pursued by India. In fact, if India had indeed taken that attitude, then the SAARC would have taken a different avatar altogether. When it comes to our neighbouring countries, say a Pakistan or Bangladesh, an even if a better relationship would improve or enhance trade, neither India nor the neighbouring countries would pursue that option because of national pride. There is a wrong notion of bilateral relationship comes in the way of India pursuing a right Foreign Policy using economic means as a roadmap to build better relationships. India’s relationship with South East Asia or with Europe, economic factor does play a significant factor in developing our Foreign Policy. Today, India- ASEAN ties is both a product and a strategy to enhance the larger India and South East Asia strategic partnership. Same is the case with India and Europe. Perhaps, we are moving towards a similar relationship with China as well. Trade and bilateral investments (by India) in China is playing a role in shaping India’s Foreign Policy more than its ties with the neighbouring countries— and it seems that it is unlikely to be feature as a factor anytime soon. Take Afghanistan and Myanmar for instance. India is looking at the two countries in terms of aid relationships—India is asking herself about how much it can invest in Myanmar or Afghanistan. It is not a relationship based on mutual investment, Rather, it is a strategy to upset someone else’s presence in these two countries—in case of Myanmar it is to ensure that Chinese footprint is kept minimal and in case of Afghanistan, it is of course Pakistan’s footprint. That is not an economic consideration but an aid relationship. There is talk around how “we” are pursuing a Look East Policy and how as early as the Vajpay government showed interest in the neighbouring countries around India. My question is that who are these “We” collective that we constantly refer to? If you are talking about the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) then perhaps, yes. The commerce ministry and others who could actually benefit from the economic liaisons are actually interested in pursuing the matter further. They don’t see it in the same paradigm as the PMO sees it. That is why despite a lot of promises been made by the PMO, the same is not actually translated on an economic level. Our investment has not moved—this Looking Towards the East or wherever we were supposed to look at, is not by a monolithic “we”. Finance, Commerce, Education and Petroleum Ministry are not on the same page as the PMO and the Foreign Ministry. I can give you an example to illustrate the lack of balance here; Sri Lanka wants an IIT extension in Colombo. While the PMO might very well want to have an extension as well, but the Education Ministry or the UGC has made little headway into the plan— because they are not too keen on that. Trade will continue to grow and expand in a substantial way and there has been a quantum jump in the past few years as far as you see China. But bilateral relationship will not grow in the same way. Especially if you look between 2008 and 2012, there has been exponential trade growth between the two of us. If you look at the foreign relationship, in 2012 we are were we were in 2008. Perhaps, we are waiting for a future date. In this context, the larger interaction, there has been no negative consequences as well. On the economic side, we are marching, but we are competing with each other for the global or Asian or Africa supremacy talk. We are invested in aid in those areas because business and state agencies are both interested in trade relations there.